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“State intervenes and should ever intervene only 
when public interest is engaged” (Dupuit, 1862a, p. 
645) 
 
“Political economy […] is a torch that guides and 
without which we necessarily get lost” (Dupuit, 
1861b, p. 631). 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is today regarded as one of the main methods for the evaluation 
of transport policy and projects (Thomopoulos et al., 2009; Browne and Ryan, 2011; 
Martens, 2011; van Wee, 2011). In particular, CBA would enable decision makers to evaluate 
investment in transport infrastructure and determine transport policy actions that are in line 
with public interest. For instance, in France, the clarification of the conditions of the use of 
CBA for transport decisions has been subject of many reports and guides, the most well-
known being Boiteux (1994, 2001) and Quinet (2013). 
 
CBA is also the subject of many criticisms and debates from civil society, public decision-
makers and economists. One of these debates concerns the issue of equity and social justice 
which becomes important in transport policies and transport projects (see Di Ciommo & 
Shiftan, 2017 and Litman, 2002). Equity poses a major challenge to CBA as it is usually 
applied because the redistribution of wealth and indirect effects are not taken into account. 
 
CBA is rooted in the debates between engineers of the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées in the 
nineteenth century (Etner, 1987). The work of Jules Dupuit on the measurement of “utilité 
publique”1 (1844 [1952], 1849 [1962], 1853) constitutes a major break with the method used 
until then by the engineers (Ibid; Ekelund & Hébert, 1999). After finishing his studies in Ecole 
Polytechnique in 1822 and Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées (1824), Dupuit becomes Chief 
Engineer of the Marne in 1840 and the Maine-et-Loire in 1844 (Chatzis, 2009; Reverdy, 2002; 
                                                          
1
 The concept of “utilité publique” in Dupuit’s work is different from the English expression “public utility”: 
while the latter means an organization (company or administration) providing a public service, the former 
refers to a criterion to increase the wealth of society (see section 2.2). In this paper, I will use Dupuit’s 
definition of public utility. This remark was suggested to me by one of the referees, whom I would sincerely like 
to thank. 
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2016). Then, he meets the French liberals2 of the nineteenth century such as Henri 
Baudrillart, Joseph Garnier, Gustave de Molinari…, writes articles for Journal des economists 
and takes part in many debates at the Société d’économie politique on many subjects such as 
food crises, property rights, free-trade… (Simonin & Vatin, 2002 and 2016; Poinsot, 2011). 
Today, he is commonly known as a member of the French tradition of the engineer-
economist and is recognized for his contribution to the field of public economics and 
transport economics through his articles on CBA and demand curve. 
 
In this article, I analyze Dupuit’s position on redistributions of wealth and indirect effects 
generated by transport policy and infrastructure and its relationships with collective choices. 
In other words, should these effects be taken into account to make collective choices 
according to Dupuit? This paper is based on a work in history of economic thought in which I 
analyzed all Dupuit’s works in order to understand the consistency of his economic analysis 
(Poinsot, 2011). Unlike Dupuit’s scholars (Ekelund & Hébert, 1999; Etner, 1987), I showed 
that public interest3 and public utility are two different concepts: while the former is the 
objective of society which is to maximize the welfare of the nation and protecting all natural 
rights (except natural liberty), public utility is a criterion that political economy indicates to 
the legislator in order to increase wealth which is one determinant of the welfare of society4. 
In this article, I will argue that this distinction is directly at stake when the engineer discusses 
the issue of redistributions of wealth and indirect effects. This leads Dupuit to distinguish 
between two points of view: the engineer-economist’s point of view which is only concerned 
by public utility and the legislator’s point of view which is broadly concerned by general 
interest. 
                                                          
2
 The term “liberal” is used here in the French sense of the word, referring to the nineteenth-century 
economists who believed that free market conditions were more effective than state intervention in the 
economy. 
3
 Dupuit uses public interest and general interest as equivalent terms. For instance, concerning inheritance, 
Dupuit claims that: “[People who ask for unlimited freedom for inheritance] says: you grant the owner during 
his (her) lifetime the absolute right to dispose of his (her) property; to prevent him (her) from doing after his 
(her) death what he (she) could have done during his (her) life? - It is then that the guarantee of the good use 
misses, and that no longer being retained by his (her) personal interest, in agreement with general interest 
[intérêt général], the owner could engage in posthumous eccentricities contrary to public interest [intérêt 
public]” [(1861b), p. 627]. Echoing Dupuit, I will consider the terms ‘general interest’ and ‘public interest’ to be 
synonymous. 
4
 For instance, this distinction between general interest and public utility is essential to understand the 
consistency of Dupuit’s position on the operation of railroads. For more details, see Poinsot (2016). 
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The paper is organized as follows. In section 2, I specify the difference between general 
interest and public utility in Dupuit’s thought and show that this leads to the necessity to 
distinguish between the points of view of the legislator and of the engineer-economists. In 
section 3, I specify Dupuit’s positions on redistributions of wealth and indirect effects 
generated by transport policy and infrastructures. In particular, I argue that according to 
Dupuit the engineer-economist should not take into account these effects whereas the 
legislator should be concerned by them if they might decrease the quantity of wealth and 
the welfare of society in the long run. 
 
 
2. General interest and public utility in Jules Dupuit’s thought 
 
Public interest holds a central place in Dupuit’s thought which surely stems from his 
education at the Polytechnique and the Ecole des Ponts et Chaussées. For instance, Mosca 
states that the “French civil engineers felt themselves to be the standard bearers of a 
privileged mission: that of serving and defending the intérêt general; all that has ever been 
written about them testifies to their dedication to this aim” (1998, p. 256)5. Unlike the 
secondary literature which interprets public interest as a synonym of public utility, I argue 
that they are two different concepts. In particular, general interest is the respect of the 
objective of society and it corresponds to the ‘legislator’s point of view’ (1.1) while public 
utility is only a criterion that legislator should follow to increase the wealth of society and it 
corresponds to what may be named ‘the engineer-economist’s point of view’ (1.2). 
 
2.1. General interest and the legislator’s point of view 
 
For Dupuit, general interest consists of achieving the goal of society which is to maximize the 
welfare of the nation and protecting all natural rights, except natural liberty. Indeed, he 
states that laws are enforced in order “to provide the maximum possible overall welfare for 
all of the individual members of society, by respecting – insofar as this goal allows – their 
liberties and their natural rights, which are in themselves among the most precious forms of 
                                                          
5
 For more details on the reference to public interest in the engineering tradition, see Etner (1987), Grall 
[(2004), p. 31], Mosca (1998) and Smith (1990). 
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wealth” (Dupuit, 1861b, p. 639). In the same article, he adds that society “can only exist if 
some [positive] laws or conventions adjust the interaction of its members and the use of 
some objects, and restrict the liberty and the natural rights of individuals” (Ibid.).  
In order to clarify general interest in Dupuit’s thought, it is necessary to specify his analysis 
of natural rights and his conception of welfare. 
First, with regard to natural rights, contrary to conventional readings (Vatin, 2002), Dupuit 
does not reject the existence of natural rights.6 They are four natural rights for him: i. self-
ownership (body, faculties and labor); ii. self-defense; iii. natural liberty; and iv. the respect 
of free contracts and agreements7. Dupuit differentiates between natural liberty and the 
other natural rights (self-ownership, self-defense, the respect of free contracts and 
conventions). For him, lawmakers may restrict individual liberties to increase the welfare of 
society. Indeed, by entering society, humans have given up their natural liberties: it “is not to 
be freer but to be happier that humans gather in society” (Dupuit, 1862b, p. 741). He adds 
that “to ask for an absolute, radical [and] complete liberty is to ask for the state of nature. 
[We must] accept the need for laws for the sake of public interest” (1861b, p. 636). The 
engineer gives the example of restrictions on hunting and fishing at certain times of the year: 
“Society has the right to repress… what it is harmful for society. It is not immoral to catch 
salmon over the winter: this had always been allowed; however, it has just been prohibited 
because it is now thought that this fishing could harm the production [and so the welfare of 
society]” (1863a, p. 745). Although the legislator may restrict individual liberties, Dupuit 
states that only an increase in the welfare of society justifies an infringement of them.8 
 
Unlike natural liberty, the legislator may not restrict the other natural rights (self-ownership, 
self-defense, the respect of free contracts and agreements). This might be illustrated by 
Dupuit’s position on the need for accompanying measures following changes to the 
legislation. On the basis that laws are enforced to maximize the welfare of society, he argues 
                                                          
6
 Dupuit [(1855), p. 564; (1861a), p. 583; (1862a)]. For a discussion of this point, see Poinsot (2010) and [(2011), 
pp. 69]. 
7
 On this point, Dupuit is opposed to the French liberals of his time (Bastiat, Molinari, Garnier…) on property 
rights. For him, the latter is not a natural right and should be allocated according to public utility. See Poinsot 
(2010, 2011); Sagot-Duvauroux [(2002a), (2002b), (2016)]; Sigot (2010) and Vatin (2002). 
8
 For instance, Dupuit rejects corporations because they lead to the decrease of both civil liberty and the 
welfare of society (Ibid., pp. 625-6). 
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that “if experience, if the comparison with what is happening elsewhere… leads… [society] to 
recognize that it has made a mistake, it changes its legislation, but it does not change its goal 
[the welfare of the nation]” (1861b, p. 633). So in response to changes in legislation that will 
undermine existing contracts, which are supposed to meet the self-ownership principle,9 
Dupuit argues that these changes are legitimate if, and only if, they are balanced by 
equivalent compensation: “any owner of any form of property by virtue of a [precedent of 
positive] law, may only be deprived of said property on the condition that [s]he is granted an 
equivalent [indemnity]. This is a form of natural right” (Ibid.; see also 1861a, pp. 597-8). 
Compensation can either take the form of a transitional period (for instance, Dupuit’s 
position on free-trade; Dupuit, 1861c, pp. 415-7), which allows the individual to make 
provisions in accordance with his interests, or the payment of monetary compensation to 
individuals whose economic conditions have deteriorated (1861b, p. 633).10 
 
Second, although Dupuit never attempts to clarify the nature of welfare, some of his 
statements suggest that he sees welfare as the satisfaction of human needs. This is the 
perspective from which he justifies the use of average life-expectancy as an index of the 
welfare of society (Dupuit, 1865).11  Indeed, he claims that the “average life expectancy may 
be considered as the true thermometer of the welfare of populations” (Ibid., p. 349), 
because “in places where humans live for a long time, they are certainly more comfortable 
and their needs are better satisfied” (Ibid., pp. 348-9). In other articles, he considers that 
welfare lies in the fulfillment of needs, desires (see for instance 1861c, p. 420) and 
enjoyments (1861b, p. 619). He seemed to use the three terms indifferently, as exemplified 
for instance in the following extract from an unpublished manuscript: 
“Human desires may be considered to be countless and insatiable; humans spend their lives 
desiring and seeking to fulfill these desires; to this point, no special distinction should be drawn 
between human and animal, except for the nature, the number and the variety of desires; the 
animal also has needs […]” (Dupuit, 2009, p. 53). 
Thus, welfare is the satisfaction of human needs, desires and enjoyments (Poinsot, 2011). 
                                                          
9
 This assumption is implicit in Dupuit’s analysis: indeed, he absolutely refuses any compensation for slave 
owners because slavery violates natural rights. 
10
 For a more in-depth discussion of Dupuit’s position on this point, see Poinsot [(2011), pp. 126-9]. 
11
 There are two indexes of the welfare of society in Dupuit’s work: the average life-expectancy (1865) and the 
proportion of intellectual workers in population [(1861c), pp. 455-7]. For a discussion of these two indexes, see 
Poinsot [(2011), pp. 231-49]. 
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In previous works (Poinsot, 2010, 2011), I have shown that for Dupuit the welfare of society 
depends on wealth and the level of population. To increase the welfare of society, the 
legislator has to raise wealth, which is all goods and services that satisfy human needs. But, 
how does the legislator know if laws increase wealth? By relating the welfare of society to 
wealth, Dupuit gives political economy and public utility an important place in public 
decisions (Dupuit, 1861b, p. 631). 
 
2.2. Public utility and the engineer-economist’s point of view 
 
Public utility is different from public interest since it is only related to one determinant of the 
welfare of society, which is wealth. For Dupuit, public utility is an impartial criterion that 
should be followed by the legislator in order to increase the wealth of society. It provides the 
solution “to every problem of wealth appropriation and many other economic questions” 
(1861b, p. 638). For instance, it may solve “the question of taxes, which is much better 
established and allocated if it does not harm the wealth [of the nation] […] [or moreover], 
the question of the coalition or the association of certain interests which should only be 
authorized on the condition that it does not harm the public interest” (Ibid., footnote 49). 
 
The engineer has said more about public utility in his famous articles on the measurement of 
public utility (1844 [1952], 1849 [1962], 1853). At the beginning of “On the measurement of 
the utility of public works” (1844 [1952]), he claims that: 
“Legislators have prescribed the formalities necessary for certain works to be declared of public 
utility; political economy has not yet defined in any precise manner the conditions which, these 
works must fulfill in order to be really useful; at least, the ideas which have been put about on 
this subject appear to us to be vague, incomplete, and often inaccurate. Yet the latter question is 
more important than the former; enquiries—be they ever so numerous—, laws and ordinances 
will not make a road, a railway or a canal useful if it is not so already. The law ought merely to 
confirm the facts demonstrated by political economy. How is such demonstration to be made? 
Upon what principles, upon what formula, does it rest? How, in a word, is public utility to be 
measured?” (1844, p. 205 [1952, p. 83]). 
This issue is in line with the concerns of the engineers of the Corps des Ponts et Chaussées 
from this time. Indeed, in response to what they consider to be arbitrary in the decisions to 
build transport infrastructures under the Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte, the engineers try to 
develop rational method to make collective choices. Their method is based on the 
comparison of the costs and the benefits of a transport infrastructure (Etner, 1983, p. 1021 
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and p. 1987, pp. 149-50; Ekelund & Hébert, 1999, pp. 74-6; Grall, 2004). For measuring 
benefits, the method at this time is the one of another engineer, Henri Navier, which is 
based on the measurement of utility of Jean-Baptiste Say by the exchange value, or the 
market price. Then, public utility is measured by the difference between transport costs. 
Based on the reformulation proposed by Pellegrino Rossi of ‘use value’ and ‘exchange value’ 
in ‘direct utility’ and ‘indirect utility’ (Béraud, 2005; Grall & Vatin, 1998, 2002 and 2016), 
Dupuit is opposed to the method of the engineers to measure public utility. In particular, 
two criticisms are formulated by Dupuit: first, one should take into account production costs 
and not only transport costs; the second criticism concerns the measurement of benefits by 
market price. 
 
First, it is necessary to take into account the difference between production costs (including 
transport costs but also, for instance, the cost of extraction stones) and not only the 
difference between transport costs. At this time, the engineers measure public utility by the 
difference between transport costs. To assess the utility of the improvement of an existing 
transport infrastructure, they compare the initial cost – before the improvement – of the 
transport with the anticipated cost because of this improvement. If we take the case of a 
new transport infrastructure, they compare the anticipated cost of transporting a good on 
that new route and the cost on the nearest transport infrastructure, whatever the 
infrastructure concerned. Dupuit criticizes this method since the comparison should be 
made on the total production costs. Indeed, the cost of transporting, for example, one ton of 
stone per road may be higher than a canal, but the road may have a higher public utility, by 
allowing access to a quarry where the extraction of the stone is easier, thus reducing the 
cost of extraction. 
 
The second criticism relates the measurement of utility and benefit by the market price 
which imply an overvaluation of the public utility of transport infrastructure. For Dupuit, 
market price is only a minimum and not the measure of the utility or benefit: if an individual 
buys a good in spite of its price, it is because for him the benefit to consume it is at least 
equal to this price. He illustrates this point by the following metaphor: 
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“If you take the above figure as the measure – and not as the lower limit – of a quantity the exact 
magnitude of which you do not know, you are acting like a man who, wishing to measure the 
height of a wall in the dark and finding that he cannot reach the top with his arm raised, says: 
‘This wall is two meters high, for if it were not, my hand would reach above it’. Now, if you say 
that the wall is at least two meters in height, then we are agreed; but if you go so far as to say 
that this is the actual measurement, then we are no longer agreed. In daylight, and equipped 
with a ladder, you will perceive that our alleged two-meter wall is fifty meters high” (1844, pp. 
206-7 [1952, p. 84]). 
The measurement of utility by market price implies an overvaluation to the public utility of a 
transport infrastructure. For the engineers, a decrease in transport costs would increase the 
number of goods transported. Until then, there is no difficulty (although production costs 
have to be taken into account rather than transport costs). But the problem arises from the 
fact that they attribute the same utility to the new goods transported as goods formerly 
transported. For instance, imagine that one have to assess the public utility of the 
improvement of a transport infrastructure (Table 1). The initial traffic is 10 tons of freight per 
year and the price is 5 euros per ton; then, the public utility of transport infrastructure for 
the initial traffic is 50 euros. The improvement of the infrastructure leads to an increase of 
20 tons of freight per year, which would imply 30 tons per year after the improvement. As 
the price is always 5 euros per ton, the engineers’ method implies that the new traffic has an 
utility of 100 euros for 20 tons; then, the public utility of the infrastructure after the 
improvement is 150 euros for 30 tons. Now, for Dupuit, this method overstates the public 
utility since for the new traffic, the benefit is not of 5 euros per ton, but it is between 0 and 
under 5 euros. As a result, the public utility of the transport infrastructure after the 
improvement would be between 50 and under 150 euros for 30 tons. 
Table 1: Comparison of engineers’ and Dupuit’s methods to assess public utility 
 Traffic 
Engineers’ method  
(per traffic unit) 
Dupuit’s method 
(per traffic unit) 
Initial traffic 10 5 5 
New traffic 20 5 [0, 5[ 
Total traffic after the 
improvement 
30   
Public utility (total benefits) 150 [50, 150[ 
 
For Dupuit, the measurement of utility (or benefit) is not the market price – which is only a 
minimum – but the maximum sacrifice that an individual is willing to pay in order to get a 
good, or what we name today “the willingness to pay”. Indeed, why “is the bottle of wine 
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purchased at 15 sous? It is because the buyer finds at least an equivalent utility in it; for, in 
spite of the tax, he is at perfect liberty to buy it or not to buy it” (1844, p. 208 [1952, p. 85]). 
And Dupuit adds that to “sum up, political economy has to take as the measure of the utility 
of an object the maximum sacrifice which each consumer would be willing to make in order 
to acquire the object” (1844, p. 213 [1952, p. 89]). 
 
Thus, in Dupuit’s thought, general interest and public utility are two different concepts. The 
former is the objective of society which means that it is more global than public utility since 
it is concerned by increasing the welfare of society as well as protecting natural rights other 
than natural liberty. Public utility is only a criterion for assessing whether or not public 
decisions rise wealth, which is only one determinant of the welfare of society (see p. 7). Then 
it is necessary to distinguish between the point of view of the legislator which is concerned 
by the welfare of society and general interest, and the engineer-economist’s point of view 
which is only concerned by public utility and the wealth of society. These two different 
points of view is also at stake when Dupuit discusses the issue of taking into account the 
redistribution of wealth and indirect effects of transport policy in collective choices. 
 
 
3. Should we take into account the redistribution and indirect effects in CBA and public 
decisions? 
 
The issue of the redistribution of wealth and indirect effects and the distinction between the 
point of view of the engineer-economist and the one of the legislator appear in Dupuit’s 
articles on the measurement of public utility (1844 [1952], 1849 [1962], 1853). For him, the 
engineer-economist should not be concerned by the redistribution of wealth and indirect 
effects since they do not have impacts on the public utility of a transport infrastructure 
whereas the legislator should take into account these effects because they may have 
negative impacts on the quantity of wealth and the welfare of society in the long run (2.1). 
However, in these three articles, Dupuit does not provide many elements on the conditions 
that are necessary to justify a compensation of these redistribution of wealth by the 
legislator. A look at the other works of Dupuit enables this clarification (2.2). 
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3.1. Redistribution and indirect effects in the articles on the measurement 
of public utility (1844, 1849, 1853) 
 
For Dupuit, from the point of view of the engineer-economist, the only relevant criterion is 
the deadweight loss, whatever the redistribution and indirect effects are. As Maneschi noted 
it (1996, p. 420), “distributional changes do not cause any change in ‘utility’ because Dupuit 
restricted the use of this term to the direct impact of the project on commodity flows”.  
 
Concerning the issue of the redistribution of wealth, Dupuit claims that the problem of a 
high toll on a mean of communication is not the redistribution of wealth from the consumers 
to the transport infrastructure operator that it implies. Indeed, if “the toll had no other 
result [than the increase in the profit of the operator] […], we might say it has no effect on 
public wealth other than to change its distribution” (1849, p. 280 [1962, p. 12]). But it is the 
“dead loss for everybody” (1849, p. 277 [1962, p. 12]) due to the high toll, or what Dupuit 
names a “utility lost, which corresponds to the number of crossings which would be made if 
the toll were abolished and are not made at the existing rate” (1849, p. 277 [1962, p. 9]). In 
other words, what bothers Dupuit on a high toll is not that what we name today the 
“consumers’ surplus” (“utilité relative” in Dupuit’s words) are low but rather that it implies a 
deadweight loss and a decrease of the public utility of the infrastructure. This is also for this 
reason that for him the optimal pricing is perfect price discrimination since it deletes the 
deadweight loss and maximizes the public utility of the transport infrastructure (1849, p. 280 
[1962, p. 12]). 
 
As regards the issue of indirect effects generated by the construction or the improvement of 
a transport infrastructure, Dupuit questions the relevance of integrating them in CBA. For 
instance,  
“It often happens […] that when the cost of production of an article falls, competition causes the 
price of the same commodity produced by a different method to fall to the same level, as it does 
also for similar commodities. Thus, coal is carried by canal […] [which, due to] competition […] 
[implies] a fall in the price of wood, which the canal does not carry” (1844, p. 226 [1952, p. 98]). 
For Dupuit, these indirect effects should not be taken into account in the measurement of 
public utility of transport infrastructures because they “might equally well have been 
obtained by a simple legislative measure” (1844, p. 227 [1952, p. 99]). For instance, imagine 
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the case of the construction of a canal that would not transport any goods but which would 
have the effect of encouraging the producers of wood, iron… of a region to lower their prices 
in order to retain their position in the market. Dupuit states that “it is evident that the utility 
due to this fall of price and thereby enlarged consumption, cannot be attributed to the 
canal, which, carrying nothing, is but a fiction, so to speak, and the course of which could be 
replaced by a line of stakes.” (1844, p. 227 [1952, p. 99]). So, taking into account the indirect 
effects in the measurement of public utility of the infrastructure, we do not know if the 
increase in public utility derives from the construction of the transport infrastructure or if it 
results from other factors such as the increase of the level of competition. From the 
engineer-economist’s point of view, what is important is whether the construction of the 
transport infrastructure increases the quantity of wealth of society. And its objective is not 
to take into account all the impacts on the welfare of society since the latter is the concern 
of the legislator. Dupuit concludes that: 
“Therefore when measuring the utility of public undertakings only those commodities must be 
included, to the production of which the undertaking contributes directly. When the method of 
evaluation outlined above is applied to those commodities, one may be sure not only of omitting 
nothing which should be included, but also of counting in nothing which should be left out” 
(1844, p. 228 [1952, p. 100]). 
As Béraud points out (2006), Dupuit’s position on the indirect effects leads to the conclusion 
that he reflects in partial equilibrium. This is on this point that Dupuit is criticized by another 
engineer of Ponts et Chaussées, Bordas (1847, pp. 91-2), a criticism which will be taken up 
later by Léon Walras. 
 
Unlike the engineer-economist who may not take into account neither the redistribution of 
wealth nor the indirect effects of a transport infrastructure, the legislator who is concerned 
by general interest and the welfare of society should be taken them into account. Indeed, 
Dupuit states that: 
“When we say that we are not to take them into account [the redistribution of wealth and 
indirect effects], we are speaking only with respect to the calculation of utility. The state, on the 
contrary, must concern itself very seriously with them. A new means of communication is 
opened; whilst it has a utility of 10 million for society as whole, yet it causes one million to pass 
from Peter’s pocket into Paul’s. Although this may at first be merely an individual misfortune, it 
will have repercussions on the wealth of society which the state has an interest in preventing, 
redressing or mitigating” (1844, pp. 226-7 [1952, p. 99]). 
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Unlike the economist who is only concerned by public utility and the wealth of society, the 
state have to take into account the redistributive and indirect effects of the build or the 
improvement of a transport infrastructure since they may have long-term impacts on the 
wealth of society and so on the welfare of society and general interest. But what are the 
conditions necessary for the legislator to compensate the redistribution of wealth and the 
indirect effects of the build of a transport infrastructure? 
 
3.2. Which kinds of redistribution and indirect effects should be 
compensated by the state? 
 
For Dupuit, the distribution of wealth is determined by the law of supply and demand. This 
means that it results from human faculties, needs, and tastes (1861a, p. 601), or from what 
Dupuit names the “public” (Ibid). This may lead to “results that seem odd; a dancer or a 
singer might have wages much higher than the one of magistrate and of the general” (Ibid). 
However, the distribution of wealth might vary over time; the question arises as to whether, 
in such a perspective, state intervention to correct this would be justified. Dupuit’s response 
is clear: if the state is not responsible for the evolution of the distribution of wealth among 
individuals in society, the legislator should not try to correct it. More precisely, for the 
engineer, redistributions of wealth among members of society may have three origins: 
nature, individual actions and the state’s decisions (Poinsot, 2011, pp. 271-3). I will only 
focus on the latter two because they are the only ones that may be related to the issue of 
transport. 
 
Redistributions of wealth may first result from the actions of individuals; for instance, when 
an individual introduces a new machine into the production process. As Dupuit claims it, 
inventions and innovations might imply major changes in the distribution of wealth among 
the members of the nation and “ruins some and increases the wealth of others” (1861a, p. 
602). Dupuit never mentions the possibility for the state to compensate for the losses of the 
producer who has seen his (her) revenues collapse due to the entry of a competitor using a 
superior technology. For him, the actions of individuals which imply a redistribution of 
wealth are motivated by the search for profit and therefore have positive impacts on the 
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wealth of society and so on the welfare of the nation. This argument applied to the field of 
transport leads to the conclusion that an innovation that call into question some interests 
should not, in Dupuit’s view, be the object of any compensation.  
 
Another source of redistribution of wealth is the action of the state. The legislator should be 
concerned about the effects of these redistributions of wealth on the welfare of society. But 
does it have to intervene in all cases? Dupuit’s response is a negative one: compensation by 
the state is not required when the redistribution of wealth has no impact on the quantity of 
wealth and so on the welfare of society; on the other hand, it is necessary for the legislator 
to intervene when the redistribution of wealth have a long-term negative influence on the 
welfare of society. 
 
But why, according to Dupuit, the way in which wealth is distributed among individuals is 
likely to have an impact on the quantity of wealth of society. The engineer does not provide 
any argument in his articles on the measurement of public utility (1844, 1849 and 1853). 
Elements appear in his book on free trade, La liberté commerciale (1861c), as well as in the 
rest of his work. He uses two arguments: the first relates to the impact of a redistribution of 
wealth on the moral responsibility of individuals; the second is the link between the merit 
and quality of an individual’s work and its income.  
 
First, a redistribution of wealth would decrease the moral responsibility of individuals, in 
particular for the poor. For instance, imagine that the construction of a transport 
infrastructure implies a redistribution of wealth to the benefit of the poor. According to the 
engineer, “misery is […] a consequence of individual freedom; it is in our societies the 
punishment of misconduct, just as welfare is the reward of labor and foresight” (1861c, p. 
489). The poor are poor because they have more children than their income permits. Then, a 
transport infrastructure which has the consequence to increase the income of the poor 
would have the effect of increasing the level of population, thus reducing the average wealth 
of society as well as its welfare. Indeed, “if one were able to improve their situation [of the 
poor] in an artificial way, they would increase the number of their children” (1865c, p. 374). 
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Second, redistribution of wealth may reduce the quantity of wealth and the quality of 
products because it may reduce the relationship between an individual’s income and its 
effort and the quality of his (her) work. This argument is not directly exposed by Dupuit but 
it derives from his position in a debate at Société d’Economie Politique which is a comparison 
between the ability of the state and larges companies to operate firms (Dupuit, 1862c).  In 
his speech, he distinguishes different forms of firms (ordinary firms, collective industry and 
specific industry such as, for instance, railways and network industries) based on the link 
that exists between the work of an individual and the result of this work, his (her) wage. For 
Dupuit, the individual provides a most intense and quality work when his (her) wage is 
consistent with his (her) work (1862c, p. 584). In another debate concerning workers’ 
associations, he rejects this type of organization because there is no link between the 
individual work and his (her) wage (Dupuit, 1863b, p. 765). This means that a redistribution 
of wealth may have negative impacts on the effort and the quality work provided by 
individuals by breaking the link between wage and the quality of the work of an individual. 
As a result, to prevent the decrease of the quantity of wealth in the long run, state should 
compensate the redistribution of wealth deriving from its decisions. But state should not 
intervene when this redistribution has no impacts on the quantity of wealth. 
 
Thus, for Dupuit, two conditions are necessary to justify the intervention of the state in 
order to compensate a redistribution of wealth: 
i. The state should be the cause of the redistribution of wealth among the 
members of society; 
ii. This redistribution of wealth should have negative effects on the quantity of 
wealth and so on the welfare of society in the long run.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
While there are many debates today on the relationships between equity considerations and 
CBA, in this article, I analyze the thought of one precursor of the tradition of the engineer-
economist tradition, Jules Dupuit, on the issue of the redistribution and indirect effects 
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caused by transport policy and infrastructure. In particular, I show that, unlike the traditional 
reading of Dupuit, it is necessary to distinguish between general interest and public utility. 
These two concepts correspond to two different points of view – the legislator’s point of 
view and the engineer-economist’s point of view – which are at stake in his position on 
redistributions of wealth and indirect effects and the opportunity to integrate them into CBA 
and collective choices. For Dupuit, the engineer-economist should not take into account 
these issues because he is only concerned by public utility whereas the legislator have to 
take them into account and compensate them when the state is the cause of them and 
when they may have negative effects on the quantity of wealth in the long run. Then, 
redistribution and indirect effects should not be integrated into CBA whereas it should be 
taken into account for collective choices. In other words, in the case of project assessment, 
while CBA should only be concerned by the impacts which can be directly assigned to a 
project, the public decision maker should also consider indirect and redistribution effects 
that might have negative impacts on the wealth and welfare of society in the long run. 
 
Dupuit’s thought raises the issue of the place of CBA in collective choices. In particular, 
should we ask CBA to take into account all impacts of transport policies and infrastructure 
projects? Or, should CBA only focus on some of these effects? Without any doubt, Dupuit 
would prefer the latter. But, economic analysis might also help the legislator to analyze 
wealth redistribution and inequalities caused by transport projects and policies. 
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